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Waiver? Not Yet: After More Than
Eight Years of Pre-Trial Litigation
the Second Circuit Orders
Arbitration
Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Shell Oil Co. and Scallop Petroleum Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration clauses, like most terms in a contract, are enforceable against either
party and, unless expressly or impliedly waived, should be enforced. While the
federal courts and Congress have a policy that strongly favors arbitration, in some
situations the factual nature of the case leads the court to conclude that the right to
arbitrate the matter has been waived. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re
Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Shell Oil Co. and Scallop Petroleum Co., addressed
this issue; however the court concluded that the policy favoring the enforcement of
arbitration provisions outweighed the prejudice to Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.
("Crysen") and affirmed the ruling of the district court.2 Additionally, the court
concluded that the bankruptcy courts have the power to stay non-core proceedings
in bankruptcy in favor of arbitration.3
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Crysen was engaged in the business of selling oil.4 Defendant Scallop
Petroleum ("Scallop"), a former subsidiary of Defendant Shell Oil Company
("Shell"), entered into two contracts with Crysen for the purchase and delivery of
oil.' The oil eventually delivered to Scallop exceeded the maximum sulfur content
allowed by the contract and Scallop refused to accept over two-hundred thousand
barrels.6 Citing a "time is of the essence" clause in the contract, Scallop refused to
allow Crysen any additional time to remedy the alleged defect. 7 Due to changes in
1. 226 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2000).
2. Id. at 161.
3. Id.
4. Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Shell Oil Co. and Scallop Petroleum Co., 240 B.R. 166, 167-68
(S.D. N.Y. 1999).
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the oil market, Crysen was forced to resell the oil at a lower price and Scallop was
8
able to purchase replacement oil for a lower price.
Crysen filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in
June of 1986, and on March 16, 1987, filed suit against Scallop based upon their
refusal of the oil. 9 Scallop's initial answer, relying on an arbitration clause in the
contract, asserted the affirmative defense of arbitration.10 On May 29, 1987,
Scallop's motion to stay the proceedings and submit to arbitration was denied, and
Scallop failed to file an interlocutory appeal at that time." Following Crysen's
amended complaint, Scallop and Shell filed four additional answers, none of which
included the affirmative defense of arbitration.' 2 The parties then engaged in
extensive discovery over the course of the next five years, ending with the
bankruptcy court's decision to stay the proceeding in favor of arbitration. 3 The
arbitration panel issued an award in favor of Scallop and Shell and returned the
matter to the bankruptcy court, which approved the arbitration award and
recommended to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice.' 4
Upon dismissal, Crysen appealed the district court's decision.'5
The district court, in accepting the proposal of the bankruptcy court, stated that
the power to compel arbitration was within the power of the bankruptcy court.'6
Additionally, the court ruled that Scallop and Shell had not waived their right to
arbitration and the award was not entered with manifest disregard for the law."' The
decision of the district court was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in August 2000, more than fourteen years after the commencement of the lawsuit. 8
Crysen argued that Scallop and Shell waived their right to arbitrate the matter
by failing to replead the arbitration defense in their amended answers and that the
power to stay the proceedings was beyond the scope of the bankruptcy court's
power.' 9 The Second Circuit, holding that "failure to include in an amended
pleading a defense that already had been rejected ... did not constitute an express
waiver of the defense," affirmed the judgment of the district court.2 0
8. Id.
9. Crysen/Montenay, 240 B.R. at 168.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 161.
13. Id. at 161-62.
14. Id. at 162.
15. Id.
16. Crysen/Montenay, 240 B.R. at 180.
17. Id.
18. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 160.
19. Id. In addition to the two main arguments made by Crysen, the court was presented with a third
contention that the court's de novo review of the arbitration award was not warranted. Id. at 162. In
dismissing this third claim, the court of appeals stated that the review was legally sufficient and the
district court followed the commands of § 157(c) in reviewing arbitration awards. Id. at 167.
20. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 167.
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Under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 2 ' arbitration provisions for the
resolution of future disputes in commercial contracts are rendered "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable."22 Additionally, the FAA provides that the courts of
the United States may stay any legal action pending arbitration23 and authorizes
courts to issue an order compelling arbitration upon a showing of "failure, neglect,
or refusal" by one of the parties to comply with the arbitration clause.24 The FAA
established a "federal policy favoring arbitration"; a policy which requires courts to
"rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."25 Compliance with the FAA and its
requirements are the reasons why courts examine with great scrutiny any questions
regarding a party's waiver of the right to arbitrate.26 Disputes also arise over the
ability of bankruptcy courts to enforce the provisions of the FAA in bankruptcy
proceedings, including the ability of bankruptcy courts 27 to stay proceedings, both
core 2 and non-core,29 in favor of arbitration."'
A. Waiver of Right to Arbitrate
"Right to arbitration, like any other contract right, can be waived."31 However,
in support of the policy favoring arbitration, courts take the position that a "waiver
21. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
22. Id. § 2:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (emphasis
added).
23. Id. § 3:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application ofone
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration,
24. Id. § 4: "A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under
a written agreement tor arbitration may petition any United States district court... tbran order directing
that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement."
25. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,226 (1987) (quoting Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 (1983) and Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
26. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Webster Auto Parts Inc., 128 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1997).
27. See In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d 631 (2d Cir. 1999).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A-O) (1994). See also In re U.S. Lines, 197 F.3d at 637.
29. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(4), (c)(1).
30. See, e.g., In re U.S. Lines, 197 F.3d. 631; hI re National Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056 (5th Cir.
1997); Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1989).
31. Comell & Co. v. Barber& Ross Co., 360 F2d 513 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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of arbitration is not to be lightly inferred. 3 2 In cases where a question of waiver
arises, the courts look for an express waiver or examine the circumstances to
determine if the right to arbitrate has been implicitly waived. Courts approach the
subject of waiver on a case-by-case basis and while there are certain factors
examined in most cases "there is no bright line rule... for determining when a party
has waived its right to arbitration."34
The districts are split as to whether the failure to replead the affirmative defense
ofarbitrability in subsequent pleadings, after an explicit denial by a court, constitutes
an express waiver of the defense.3" The Ninth Circuit requires that parties replead
the issue, upon rejection, and failure to comply with this rule waives the cause of
action or defense.36 In Marx v. Loral Corp., the plaintiffs were considered to have
waived one of their causes of action because the district court failed to recognize an
independent contract they had with their former employer. 7 That cause of action
was presented in the original complaint but dismissed by the district court and not
presented in subsequent proceedings. 8 The court of appeals acknowledged this
argument but remained consistent with the Ninth Circuit's view that "all causes of
action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended
complaint are waived" and reiterated that "if appellant desired to rely upon the
original complaint, it should have refused to plead further."3 9 However, the Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits do not require subsequent repleading of a defense that was
previously denied by the court.40 For example, in Davis v. TXO Production Corp.
the Tenth Circuit was presented with a case in which the appellant filed two
amended complaints but failed to incorporate any portion of the first amended
complaint into the second complaint. 4' The appellee argued that the failure of
appellant to include in the second amended complaint a breach of implied covenant
claim, which was present in the previous complaint, constituted a waiver of the right
to raise this argument on appeal.4 2 The Tenth Circuit concluded that "a rule
requiring plaintiffs who file amended complaints to replead claims previously
dismissed on their merits sets a trap for unsuspecting plaintiffs., 43 Relying on this
view, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a party is not required to reallege a cause of action
conclusively denied by a district court and the failure to reallege does not constitute
a waiver.4 This issue has not been resolved by the United States Supreme Court but,
32. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 162.
33. Id. at 162-63.
34. PPGIndus., 128 F.3d at 107-08.
35. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 162.
36. Marx v. Loral Corp., 87 F.3d 1049, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 1996).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1052, 1055-56.
39. Id. at 1055-56 (citing King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) and Studio Carpenters
Local Union No. 946 v. Loew's, Inc., 182 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1950)).
40. See Dunn v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 193 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11 th Cir. 1999); Davis v. TXO Prod.
Corp., 929 F.2d 1515, 1517-18 (10th Cir. 1991).
41. Davis, 929 F.2d at 1516-17.
42. Id. at 1517.
43. Id. at 1518.
44. Id.
The district court's dismissal of the claim made clear that any attempt by appellant to
reallege that claim would be futile. Because we do not require a party to reallege a cause
[Vol. 2001, No. I
4
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2001, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2001/iss1/8
Waiver? Not Yet
in light of the criticism acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit in Marx,45 the trend
appears to indicate that courts will not require the defense of arbitration to be
presented in subsequent pleadings.46
Throughout the years the courts have attempted to identify many different ways
in which parties may implicitly waive their contractual right to arbitration.47 Because
of the overwhelming preference for arbitration, "any doubts concerning whether
there had been a waiver are resolved in favor of arbitration. '  But despite the
preference for arbitration, courts have concluded that "nonetheless, a party waives
its right to arbitration when it engages in protracted litigation that prejudices the
opposing party. 49
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in PPG Industries, Inc. v. Webster Auto
Parts Inc. attempted to establish a test that would aid courts in evaluating the alleged
waiver of the right to arbitrate. ° In PPG Industries, PPG filed two collection
actions, the "Premium" action and the "Webster" action," against distributors of
their products, involving basically the same parties. 2 In both actions counterclaims
were filed against PPG; however, PPG did not appeal the district court's denial of
arbitration in "Premium" and subsequently engaged in discovery and filed a motion
for summary judgment. 3 The court, citing PPG's conduct in "Premium" and
"Webster," held PPG' s conduct in both matters "was inconsistent with its contractual
right to compel arbitration and that Webster was prejudiced by this conduct." 4 In
reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit set forth three main factors to
consider." The first factor was the amount of time between the commencement of
the lawsuit and the request for arbitration. 6 Second, the PPG Industries test focused
on the amount of litigation engaged in by the party seeking to arbitrate the matter.
5 7
The third aspect of the test examined the prejudice to the opposing party. 8
of action on which the district court has conclusively ruled, we conclude that appellant has
not waived his claim of a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Id.
45. The Ninth Circuit noted: "Other courts, as well as legal scholars, have criticized this Circuit's rule
as 'formalistic,' 'rigid,' and 'too mechanical."' (citations omitted) As another panel of this court has
noted, however: "We are well aware that other circuits do not look with favor upon this rule ... but we
as a panel are not at liberty to reexamine its validity." Marx, 87 F.3d at 1056 (quoting London v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)).
46. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 162.
47. See, e.g., PPG Indus., 128 F.3d 103; M & I Elec. Indus., Inc., v. Rapistan Dernag Corp., 814 F.
Supp. 545 (E.D. Tex. 1993); Steinberg & Lyman v. Takacs, 774 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Central
Trust Co., N.A. v. Anemostat Prods. Div., 621 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
48. PPG Industries, 128 F.3d at 107.
49. Id. (citing Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1997); Cotton v. Slone,
4 F.3d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1993); Kramer v. Hammond, 943 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1991)).
50. PPGIndus., 128 F.3d at 107-10.
51. Id. at 104. The first action, the "Premium" action, was PPG's suit against Webster Auto Parts,
Inc., Premium Paint Company, Inc., and Anthony and Patricia Pulco. In the second action, the
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However, the court conceded that the test is not a "bright line" rule and cases should
be examined on their own particular facts.59
The first prong of the test is fairly straightforward. Courts simply make a
determination based on the amount of time elapsed between the filing of the lawsuit
and the request to arbitrate.60 The PPG Industries court considered the five-month
delay in that case not to constitute a waiver.6" In making this determination the court
considered the amount of prejudice to the defendant by the delay and the amount of
litigation which occurred in the five-month period.62
In analyzing the second prong of the test, courts 63 have attempted to provide
limits on how much litigation constitutes a waiver' and what effect engaging in
"self-help" methods has on the ability to seek arbitration. 65 Additionally, courts have
attempted to define the amount of time a party can delay an attempt to stay legal
proceedings in favor of arbitration.66 While not providing a bright line rule, courts
appear to have established a general time frame in finding that six to nine months
was not considered a waiver while fifteen to eighteen months constituted a waiver."7
However, in cases dealing with delay, courts look to the conduct of the parties and
other circumstances present in the case before making a final determination on
waiver of the right to stay the trial in favor of arbitration." Courts have held that
participation in litigation does not automatically constitute a waiver of the right to
arbitrate, but the conduct of the party seeking to arbitrate will be examined for action
inconsistent with the right to arbitrate, such as extensive pre-trial discovery or
numerous appeals.69
The prejudice factor, as defined by the Second Circuit in Doctor Associates.
Inc. v. Distajo, centers around the inherent unfairness stemming from one party's
59. Id. at 107-08.
60. Id. at 108.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See. e.g., Doctor's Assocs., 107 F.3d at 134; Kramer, 943 F.2d at 179 (holding that a party v. lit)
delayed invoking arbitration rights by filing multiple appeals, thus causing theiradversary to incur added
expenses, waived their right to compel arbitration); Com-Tech Assocs. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc.,
938 F.2d 1574, 1576-77 (2d Cir. 1991) (engaging in extensive pre-trial discovery and fbrcing opposition
to respond constituted a waiver of right to compel arbitration).
64. PPGIndus., 128 F.3d at 108-09.
65. Southwest Indus. Import & Export, Inc. v. Wilmond Co., 524 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1975).
66. Compare Touton, S.A.v. M/V Rizcun Trader, 3 F. Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. Pa. 1998), vacated, 15 F.
Supp. 2d 669, affd, 30 F. Supp. 2d 508 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that six to nine month delay in seeking
to stay the proceedings in favor of arbitration was not a waiver of right to compel arbitration), with
Central Trust, 621 F. Supp. 44 (failing to seek arbitration until 15 months after liling and three months
after the postponement of trial date did not preclude the court from finding that the seller of ventilation
equipment had waived their contractual right to arbitration).
67. See cases cited supra note 66.
68. PPG Indus., 128 F.3d at 107-08.
69. Compare Cornell & Co., 360 F.2d 512 (finding waiver when party actively participates in lawsuit
or takes other action inconsistent with the right), with American Dairy Queen Corp. v. Tantillo, 536 F.
Supp. 718 (M.D. La 1982) (finding that despite filing of motions and answering of int-rrogatories,
defendants had not reached the level of litigation where the right to stay in favor of arbitration is lost).
[Vol. 2001, No. I
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actions." Consistent with the definition of "prejudice,"'" in making a determination
of waiver, courts will examine the harm to the nonmoving party if arbitration is
allowed. 72  In PPG Industries, the court noted that extensive use of pre-trial
discovery to gather information not available in arbitration prejudiced the defendant
and thus waived PPG Industries' right to arbitrate the matter. 3 Other actions found
to create undue prejudice to the nonmoving party include making motions attacking
the merits of the adversary's claims74 or delaying arbitration in an effort to force the
nonmoving party to incur unnecessary expenses."
B. Power of the Bankruptcy Court to Stay Non-Core Proceedings
The power to stay proceedings in favor of arbitration is given to the "courts of
the United States" by the FAA.76 Disputes in this area arise over the definition of
"courts of the United States," as used in the FAA. 77 The argument is based on the
idea that "courts of the United States" is meant to refer only to the courts established
by Article III of the United States Constitution.78 Additionally, the FAA does not
define "courts of the United States" for purposes of statutory interpretation, thus
leaving the courts the power to interpret the phrase.79 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, based on the statements of "several influential legislators," concluded that
bankruptcy jurisdiction should be construed as broadly as possible. The Second
Circuit reached its decision by relying on the First Circuit's conclusion in In re
Arnold Print Works, Inc. In Arnold, the First Circuit examined the opinions of
Representatives Kastenmeier and Kindness," sponsors of the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984, and concluded that the
"legislative history ... indicates that Congress intended that 'core proceedings'
would be interpreted broadly, close to or congruent with constitutional limits."'82
Additionally, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
concluded, based upon the referral ofjurisdiction from the federal district courts, that
bankruptcy courts possess the power to stay proceedings and compel arbitration.83
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that where the FAA and the
70. "Prejudice as defined by our cases refers to the inherent unfairness-in terms of delay, expense,
or damage to a party's legal position-that occurs when the party's opponent forces it to litigate an issue
and later seeks to arbitrate the same issue." Doctor's Assocs., 107 F.3d at 134.
71. Id.
72. PPGIndus., 128 F.3d at 109.
73. Id. at 109-10.
74. Corn-Tech Assocs., 938 F.2d at 1576.
75. Kramer, 943 F.2d at 179.
76. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
77. Ctysen/Montenay, 240 B.R. at 170. CompareGrewe v. United States4 F.3d 299 (4thCir. 1993),
with In re Brickell Inv. Corp., 922 F.2d 696 (11 th Cir. 1991).
78. See In re Brickell, 922 F.2d at 698-702.
79. Crysen/M.Aontenay. 240 B.R. at 170.
80. In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394, 1398-99 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing In re Arnold Print Works,
Inc.. 815 F.2d 165, 168 (Ist Cir. 1987)).
8 1. Id. (citing 130 CONG. REC. El 108-1110 (daily ed. Mar. 20,1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)
and H 1848, 1 1850 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kindness)).
82. In re Ben Cooper. Inc., 896 F.2d at 1398.
83. COysen/Montenay, 240 B.R. at 170.
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Bankruptcy Code do not conflict, in the interest of preserving judicial resources,
district courts must stay "non-core proceedings" 4 in favor of arbitration.85 The
burden to show a conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and the FAA is on the party
opposing enforcement of the clause."s Implicit in the Third Circuit's conclusion that
district courts must stay proceedings in favor of arbitration87 is the conclusion that
bankruptcy courts must also stay proceedings.8 8
Under the United States Code, a bankruptcy judge is given the power to hear
proceedings not core to the bankruptcy proceeding. 9 The Code provides a
nonexclusive list of "core proceedings"9 and gives the bankruptcy judge the power
to determine, upon motion by one of the participants, whether the issue in question
is a "core proceeding."9 One of the key aspects of "non-core proceedings" is that
bankruptcy judges can only make preliminary rulings subject to the approval of the
district court judge.92 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting the United
States Supreme Court's trend in cases concerning the FAA, concluded that courts
must carefully determine if the underlying principles of the Bankruptcy Code would
be disrupted if the court were to enforce an arbitration clause; if the Code was not
"seriously jeopardized," then the matter should be arbitrated.93
The Second Circuit accepted the rationale of the Third Circuit in stating that
bankruptcy courts have the authority to stay "core proceedings" in favor of
arbitration; however, where a conflict between the FAA and the Bankruptcy Code
arises the enforcement of the arbitration clause is left to the discretion of the district
court to decide if the conflict "seriously jeopardizes the objectives of the Code. '94
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit noted that where the "core proceedings" do not
provide an inherent conflict between the FAA and the Bankruptcy Code, the
84. Hays & Co., 885 F.2d at 1159.
85. Id. at 1150,1159-61.
86. Id. at 1156-57.
87. Id. at 1150,1159-61.
88. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 166.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1):
A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is
otherwise related to a case under title I1. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final
order or judgment shall be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy
judge's proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to
which any party has timely and specifically objected.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A-O). A core proceeding is defined by Black's Law Dictionary to be "a
proceeding involving claims that substantially affect the debtor-creditor relationship." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 338 (7th ed. 1999).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3).
92. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 167 n.6.
93. Hays & Co., 885 F.2d at 1161:
Given the recent Supreme Court cases concerning the Arbitration Act, we can no longer
subscribe to a hierarchy of congressional concerns that places the bankruptcy law in a
position of superiority over that Act. The message we get from those recent cases is that
we must carefully determine whether any underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code
would be adversely affected by enforcing an arbitration clause and that we should enforce
such a clause unless that effect would seriously jeopardize the objectives of the Code.
94. In re U.S. Lines, 197 F.3d at 640 (citing Hays & Co., 885 F.2d at 1161).
[Vol. 200 1, No. I
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arbitration would not provide any greater conflict.9" The Second Circuit was not
faced with the issue of "non-core proceedings" in In re United States Lines, Inc. but
noted that the conflict with the Bankruptcy Code present in "core proceedings" is not
likely to be present in "non-core proceedings., 96 Implicit in U.S. Lines dictum is the
conclusion that where bankruptcy law and arbitration are not in serious conflict, the
bankruptcy court must stay the non-core proceedings in favor of arbitration. 9'
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Crysen/Montenay the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the efforts
of an energy company, in the midst of Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy, to avoid the decisions
of the bankruptcy judge and the district court compelling them to arbitrate a matter
after more than eight years of pre-trial litigation.9" The Second Circuit denied
Crysen's claim that Scallop and Shell had expressly waived their right to stay the
legal proceeding in favor of arbitration. 99 Although the Second Circuit had never
addressed "whether there is a futility exception" to the rule that a subsequent
pleading renders the original of no legal effect, the court chose to accept the view of
the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits-failure to reallege following an express denial does
not constitute a waiver.'00 The court acknowledged the existence of a dispute over
the rule,' 0 ' but concluded that Scallop and Shell's failure to include the arbitration
defense in the amended answers following its denial did not constitute an express
waiver of the defense.
0 2
The Court denied Crysen's second claim on appeal-that defendants' impliedly
waived their ability to enforce their contractual arbitration right.0 3 In reaching this
conclusion, the court based its reasoning on the three-factor test set forth in PPG
Industries.0 4 In addressing the first prong of the PPG Industries test, the court
concluded that the time elapsed between the filing of the suit and the defendants'
request for arbitration was minimal.'0 5 Scallop plead the defense of arbitration in its
initial answer, but shortly thereafter it was denied by the bankruptcy court. "6 The
95. Insurance Co. of North Am. v. NGC Settlement Trust & Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 118 F.3d
1056, 1067 (5th Cir. 1997).
96. In re U.S. Lines, 197 F.3d at 640: "Such a conflict is lessened in non-core proceedings which are
unlikely to present a conflict sufficient to override by implication the presumption in favor of
arbitration."
97. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 166.
98. Id. at 161-62.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 162.
101. Id. See Marx, 87 F.3d at 1056.
102. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 162: "[W]e hold that defendants' failure to include an arbitration
defense in the amended answers filed after the Bankruptcy Court had denied the initial motions to stay
did not constitute an express waiver of the defense."
103. Id. at 162-63.
104. Id. at 163-64. The court in Crysen noted that "the 'particular facts' of the instant case do not
lend themselves to ready application of the [PPG Industries] standard set forth above." Id. at 163.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 161. The suit against Scallop was filed on March 16, 1987, and their motion to stay in
favor of arbitration was denied on May 29, 1987. Id.
20011
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court noted, but was not persuaded by, Crysen's argument that the right was waived
by Scallop's failure to file an interlocutory appeal in a timely manner. The second
prong of the test, "the amount of litigation,"1 0 7 the court acknowledged was
substantial; the parties endured eight years of litigation, six of those years following
the denial of the motion to arbitrate. °0 In reference to the third aspect of the test,
proof ofprejudice," 9 the Crysen/Montenay court concluded that it "largely collapses
into the second" because of the substantial prejudice caused to Crysen by having to
litigate for eight years. "0 Nevertheless, the court declined to reverse the ruling of the
district court and affirmed the ruling that the defendants had not waived their
arbitrability defense."'
The Crysen/Montenay case forced the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to deal
with the issue of the ability of bankruptcy courts to stay "non-core" bankruptcy
proceedings in favor of the arbitration." 2 The court relied heavily on its decision in
U.S. Lines"' in which the court "makes it clear" that the ability to stay proceedings
in favor of arbitration is within the power of the bankruptcy courts."H4 Additionally,
the Second Circuit noted that when dealing with core proceedings, the bankruptcy
courts retain some discretion in deciding whether or not to grant the arbitration." 5
However, when dealing with non-core proceedings the bankruptcy courts are
required to stay the proceedings, unless the "general principles governing arbitration
and bankruptcy law" present a sufficient conflict." 6 The Second Circuit summed up
its position by taking the US. Lines decision a step further in stating that
"bankruptcy courts have authority to stay non-core proceedings in favor of
arbitration."" 7
107. PPGIndus., 128 F.3d at 107.
108. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 163.
109. PPGIndus., 128 F.3d at 107.
10. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 163.
111. Id. at 163-64:
Our conclusion-that the failure to take an interlocutory appeal of the denial of the motion
to stay did not constitute an implied waiver of defendants' arbitrability defense, despite the
intervening years of litigation that took place before the motion was renewed-does not
conflict with Cotton because that decision relied on a statutory provision that had not been
enacted in 1987, when Scallop failed to appeal. In Cotton, we [Second Circuit] held that
a defendant had waived his contractual right to compel arbitration where: (1) the District
Court denied the defendant's motion to compel arbitration; (2) he failed to take an
interlocutory appeal as of right under § 16(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), and
(3) he proceeded with discovery and made several substantive motions before finally
challenging on appeal from a final (default) judgment the denial of the motion to compel.
See Cotton, 4 F.3d at 179-80.
112. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 165-66.
113. In re U.S. Lines, 197 F.3d 631.
114. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 165.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 165-66.
117. Id. at 166.
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In Oysen/Montenay, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its position
that a waiver of a right to arbitrate will not be lightly inferred."' In affirming the
decisions of the bankruptcy judge and federal district court, the Second Circuit
enforced the arbitration clause in a situation in which the prejudice to Crysen was
obviously great." 9 The Crysen/Montenay court cites PPG Industries as the case
setting forth the standard for determining if a party has impliedly waived its right to
enforce an arbitration clause."0 Following the PPG Industries standard, the first part
of the court's analysis is focused upon "the time elapsed from commencement of
litigation to the request for arbitration."'' In this case, the court correctly points out
that the prejudice was not caused by Scallop's failure to request arbitration because
the request was filed and denied within two-and-a-half months of filing suit."'
Courts have addressed the issue of how much delay in seeking arbitration would
constitute a waiver, but the answer, depending on other factors involved in the
litigation, seems to be somewhere between nine and fifteen months.'23 The district
court acknowledged the problems which can arise when a party delays the appeal of
a motion to arbitrate until the end of the lawsuit. At the time of the denial in this
case, Congress had not taken action to prevent similar situations where extended
litigation occurs because one party failed to file an interlocutory appeal." 4 The
district court concluded that the enactment of § 16(a)'25 of the FAA was an attempt
by Congress to eliminate the inefficiency present in the Crysen/Montenay case, 2 6 but
despite the problems present in this case the court stated that "for Crysen, Congress
acted one-and-a-half years too late.' 27
As they relate to this case, the second and third prongs of the PPG Industries
test, which deal with the amount of litigation and proof of prejudice, basically
collapsed into one factor. 2 ' While the result reached in the case may have been
legally correct, the cases discussing the issue of waiver of a right to arbitrate focus
heavily on the amount of prejudice to the parties if the arbitration clause is
118. Id. at 162.
119. Id. at 163.
120. Id.
121. PPGIndus., 128 F.3d at 108.
122. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 161, 163.
123. See cases cited supra note 66.
124. Crysen/Montenay, 240 B.R. at 176. The court was referring to Congress enacting § 16(a) of the
FAA relating to when and where an appeal may be taken. Id. at 175. Section 16(a)(1)(A) relates to
appeals from an order refusing to stay any action under § 3. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a).
125. 9 U.S.C. § 16. Section 16(a) of the FAA was enacted by Congress on November 19, 1988. It
was enacted as "a pro-arbitration statute designed to prevent the appellate aspect of the litigation process
from impeding the expeditious disposition of an arbitration." David Siegel, Practice Commentary, 9
U.S.C.A. § 16 (West 1999).
126. Crysen/Montenay, 240 BR, at 174. The court relied on their interpretation of the 1988
amendment to § 16 of the FAA in Cotton, 4 F.3d 176. In Cotton, the Second Circuit held that when a
party fails to file an interlocutory appeal under FAA § 16 following the denial of a request to arbitrate,
and actively litigates the dispute, any right to arbitrate at a later date has been waived. Id. at 180.
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enforced. 2 1 Prejudice, as defined by the Second Circuit, includes inherent unfairness
created by the increased expenses and delay when a party is forced to litigate and
then later subjected to the opposing party's request to arbitrate.' 30 The court
obviously could not have been overly concerned with the prejudice to Crysen,
because at the time it enforced the arbitration clause the parties had been engaged in
more than eight years of litigation and five years of discovery. 3 ' The court justified
its decision by reasoning that while Scallop could have appealed the decision at the
time the bankruptcy court denied its initial motion, the fact that they chose not to
appeal does not make them responsible for the prejudice to Crysen. '32 The decision
in this case appears to be guided significantly by current law. The court even makes
reference to Congress acting too late; however, if prejudice is to be a key factor in
looking for a waiver, the courts should look to which of the two parties could have
most easily remedied the situation. In this case, Crysen had no option other than to
go along with the litigation because they filed the suit and would be subject to
sanctions for failure to pursue their claim. However, at any point in the eight years
of litigation, Scallop or Shell could have appealed the denial of the arbitration claim
and used current law to support their argument. 33 The court's reasoning that Scallop
and Shell did everything the law required of them at the time they took the action is
legitimate; however, the change in the law during the suit could have provided some
indication that the law does not look favorably upon parties who engage in extensive
litigation and then attempt to assert their contractual right to an appeal.'
34
Additionally, it has been noted that the determination of a waiver depends on the
facts of the individual case and should not be subject to bright line rules. 3 5 This is
a case where, perhaps, the court subjected Crysen to a set of bright line rules without
regard for the facts of the case. The ability to remedy the situation was not equal to
both sides, and eight years of litigation, regardless of the reason, should constitute
a waiver of any right to seek arbitration.
Additionally, in Crysen/Montenay the Second Circuit chose to adopt the position
of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits relating to the need to replead previously denied
causes of action in subsequent pleadings. 3 6 The court's decision not to require a
party to reallege denied causes of action in subsequent pleadings allowed Scallop
and Shell the opportunity to present the arbitration defense more than eight years
after its original denial.'37 The choice, procedurally, makes more sense because it
keeps parties from pleading and arguing causes of action that have previously been
denied. While the Ninth Circuit still adheres to the view that requires repleading
"despite obvious futility," it does acknowledge that other jurisdictions consider the
rule too rigid and mechanical.' Ciysen/Montenay presented an interesting situation
129. See PPG hldus., 128 F.3d 103; Doctor's Assocs., 107 F.3d 126.
130. Doctor's Assocs., 107 F.3d at 134.
131. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 163.
132. Id. at 165.
133. See supra notes 124-26.
134. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 164-65.
135. Cotton, 4 F.3d at 179.
136. Cryscn/Montenoy, 226 F.3d at 162.
137. Id. at 161-62. The motion to stay was originally denied on May 29, 1987, and the bankruptcy
court entered an order to arbitrate the case on November 20, 1995. Id.
138. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 162 (citing Marx, 87 F.3d at 1055-56).
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for the court because of the extended duration of the lawsuit, mainly the fact that
more than eight years passed between the denial and refiling of the motion to
arbitrate. 3 9 Compounding problems in this lawsuit was Congress' change in the law
relating to interlocutory appeals. 40
The Second Circuit made the very difficult decision to uphold the district court's
order to arbitrate the decade-old dispute.' 4 ' The court considered the decision to be
the proper choice because regardless of the situation in 1995, the simple fact is that
Scallop and Shell did all that was required of them in 1987 and a court cannot expect
parties to anticipate changes in that law.'42 However, the decision is squarely against
the PPG Industries test that the court carefully articulates within the
Crysen/Montenay opinion. 43 If the prejudice is to be considered a factor in the PPG
Industries test, then this decision cannot be the proper result; if eight years of
litigation is not sufficient to constitute proof of prejudice, then the third prong is
essentially worthless. The court attempts to justify its resolution of the matter based
upon the change in the law. 44 Regardless of who is at fault for the extreme delay in
the order of arbitration, an exception clearly should have been made for this case.
The facts of this case are so unique that the likelihood of future problems arising
from refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement are very slim. The parties, from
all indications, were ready and able to litigate the matter and possessed far more
information than would have been available upon an initial ordering of arbitration.
Therefore, the proper result would have been for the court to reverse the decision and
allow the matter to be litigated as the parties had prepared for since the late 1980s.
The Crysen/Montenay court also addressed the issue of the ability ofbankruptcy
courts to stay non-core bankruptcy court proceedings in favor of arbitration.'45 The
court made its conclusion based upon its decision in U.S. Lines. 46 The issue centers
mainly on whether bankruptcy courts have the authority to stay matters that relate
to issues outside of the bankruptcy proceeding, and the US. Lines court ruled that
bankruptcy courts were able to stay core proceedings in favor of arbitration. 47 The
decision of the trial court makes sense. If bankruptcy courts can stay core
proceedings, then proceedings arising out of the same matter, but not core to the
bankruptcy issue, should also be at the discretion of the bankruptcy judge. The court
continually notes that the policy in favor of arbitration stems largely from the desire
to preserve judicial resources, and non-core bankruptcy proceedings could easily be
viewed as an area for resource conservation. 48 This decision further emphasizes the
federal court system's preference for arbitration and the enforcement of arbitration
clauses even if this choice is made without regard to the prejudice imposed upon the
parties to the litigation.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 124-26.
141. Crysen/Montenay, 226 F.3d at 167.
142. Id. at 163-65.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 165 nn.3-5.
145. Id. at 161, 165-66.
146. Id. at 165-66.
147. Id
148. Id. at 166.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals established in Crysen/Montenay that a
party is not required to replead in subsequent pleadings the affirmative defense of
arbitration when the issue has been expressly denied and held that, even though the
parties had engaged in eight years of litigation, Scallop and Shell had not waived
their right to arbitrate.149 Courts typically focus on the amount of prejudice to the
party, if they are forced to arbitrate, when deciding on whether a party has waived
their right to arbitrate. In this case, the Second Circuit reasoned that even though the
prejudice to Crysen was substantial, it would be even more prejudicial to hold
Scallop and Shell responsible for the harm caused by eight years of litigation. 50
Additionally, the court reinforced the federal court system's preference for
arbitration by holding that bankruptcy courts have the power to stay non-core
bankruptcy proceedings in favor of arbitration.
DAVID A. GEISLER II
149. Id. at 161-62.
150. Id. at 165.
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